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he severity of the recent economic downturn 
raises questions about the role of financial 
markets in modern market economies. Why 
did rising defaults in a relatively small portion 
of the U.S. housing market cause a financial crisis? 
Why do financial crises have outsized adverse effects 
on the rest of the economy? As a general rule, a decline 
in economic activity in the nonfinancial sector, such as 
occurs during a typical recession, induces greater restraint 
on the part of the financial sector and that restraint — 
manifested usually in a pullback of credit and funding 
— in turn causes further setbacks to the nonfinancial 
sector. In the academic literature, this feedback effect is 
called the financial accelerator. In this article, Satyajit 
Chatterjee looks at what underlay the financial shock 
that emanated from Wall Street in the fall of 2007. Then 
he focuses on the channels through which the financial 
accelerator works and how the accelerator can turn a 
financial market disruption into a deep recession.
In the first quarter of 2006, when 
delinquencies on subprime mortgages 
first began their sustained rise, the 
unemployment rate in the United 
States stood at 4.75 percent. Under 
the impact of the ensuing financial 
crisis, the U.S. economy fell into 
recession in December 2007, and the 
unemployment rate shot up to 9.5 
percent within a year and a half. What 
began as a problem in the subprime 
segment of the U.S. mortgage market 
snowballed into a full-blown financial 
crisis and one of the worst recessions of 
the postwar era.
The severity of the current 
downturn raises questions about the 
role of financial markets in modern 
market economies. Why did rising 
defaults in a relatively small portion 
of the U.S. housing market cause a 
financial crisis? Why do financial 
crises have outsized adverse effects on 
the rest of the economy?
As a general rule, a decline in 
economic activity in the nonfinancial 
sector, such as occurs during a typical 
recession, induces greater restraint on 
the part of the financial sector and 
that restraint — manifested usually in 
a pullback of credit and funding — in 
turn causes further setbacks to the 
nonfinancial sector. In the academic 
literature, this feedback effect is 
called the financial accelerator. The 
terminology alludes to the fact that 
greater financial restraint can cause a 
downturn to gather additional speed 
or lesser financial restraint can cause 
an upturn to do the same. When the 
initial shock is a shock to the financial 
sector itself, the financial accelerator 
can combine with the shock to 
produce a particularly steep decline in 
economic activity.
First we’ll look at what underlay 
the financial shock that emanated 
from Wall Street in the fall of 
2007, and then we’ll focus on the 
channels through which the financial 
accelerator works and how the 
accelerator can turn a financial market 
disruption into a deep recession. 2   Q2  2010 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org
SOME BACKGROUND ON THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS
The financial crisis that erupted 
in the fall of 2007 has its origins in 
subprime mortgages, that is, loans 
made to risky borrowers for the 
purposes of buying a house. The 
subprime segment of the U.S. housing 
market is relatively small, so it is 
puzzling that default on these loans 
could become the source of a major 
financial crisis.
One reason is leverage. The 
financial firms (commercial banks, 
investment banks, and hedge funds) 
that bought the risky mortgages 
funded these purchases by borrowing 
from other financial market 
participants. Thus, when these 
mortgages began failing, it was not just 
the financial firms that had bought 
the mortgages that got into trouble, so 
did the entities that had lent money 
to the financial firms. These entities, 
typically other financial firms, in turn 
had borrowed money to fund their 
loans; so the creditors of these other 
financial firms also got into trouble. 
Leverage is the reason that a relatively 
small pool of failing assets can cause a 
systemic problem. Leverage makes the 
insolvency of one financial institution 
a trigger for the insolvency of other 
financial institutions.
But leverage alone can hardly 
be the culprit for the financial crisis. 
Leverage is at the heart of efficient 
financial intermediation and has been 
a fact of life in industrial economies for 
centuries. A more important proximate 
cause of the crisis was the manner in 
which financial firms leveraged their 
purchase of risky mortgages. They 
funded their purchases by borrowing 
short term. They promised their 
investors that they could have their 
funds back within a short period of 
time. Since the mortgages bought 
would not mature until many years 
into the future, the cash flow from 
the investment was insufficient to pay 
off the maturing debt. The financial 
firms made up the shortfall by issuing 
new short-term debt. In most cases, 
the new debt was absorbed by existing 
investors. In other words, the financial 
firms were relying on their investors 
to “roll over” their loans as the loans 
matured. The mode of operation of 
financial firms was to fund purchases 
of long-term assets (risky mortgages) 
with a sequence of short-term debt. 
That is, they engaged in maturity 
transformation.
While maturity transformation 
is part of a well-functioning financial 
system and financial firms will engage 
in it (as well as in leverage) to generate 
value for their investors, maturity 
transformation entails some risks. 
The danger is that if investors become 
nervous about a firm’s solvency, they 
can refuse to renew their loans to 
the firm and thereby put the firm in 
a real bind. This is called a rollover 
crisis. Bank runs are a famous example 
of this sort of crisis. In a bank run, 
depositors rush to withdraw their 
deposits from the bank because they 
fear the bank will fail. Banks are 
subject to rollover crises because they 
engage in maturity transformation. 
They borrow very short term (in effect 
they tell their depositors they can 
withdraw funds at any time), but they 
use the deposits to purchase assets 
that pay off gradually over time. If all 
depositors (or a good many of them) 
attempt to withdraw deposits at the 
same time, it becomes impossible for 
the bank to meet its obligations. 
Rising defaults on subprime 
mortgages in 2006 led investors to 
reassess the risks inherent in assets 
based on subprime mortgages. As the 
market value of these assets declined, 
investors became worried that future 
investors might refuse to issue new 
loans against these suspect assets. 
If that happened, the firm would be 
unable to pay off the new loan it was 
issued today. This lack of confidence 
led to a rollover crisis in which current 
investors refused to renew their loans 
to financial firms. Of course, as 
investors refused to renew their loans, 
financial firms holding suspect assets 
began to experience great difficulty in 
meeting their short-term obligations. 
In some cases, the firms simply went 
bankrupt. In other cases, the firms 
suffered huge losses in equity, since 
they had used their own funds to 
service their short-term obligations.
Leverage and maturity 
transformation were the main 
proximate causes of the financial crisis. 
But it is important to understand 
that these are proximate causes. The 
reasons why large financial firms 
engaged in this type of leveraging 
remain a matter of controversy. As 
researchers and analysts probe into the 
ultimate causes of the crisis, they will 
uncover some of the deeper reasons 
as to how and why financial firms got 
themselves into this bind. Also, it is 
important to remember that leverage 
Leverage alone can hardly be the 
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TABLE 1
Assets Liabilities
Mortgages $100 Commercial Paper $250
Business Loans  $200 Equity $50
Total $300 Total $300
1 The role of de-leveraging in the pullback of 
credit is discussed at length in the article by 
Adrian Tobias and Hyun Song Shin.
2 Commercial paper is an unsecured promissory 
note issued by large banks or corporations with 
a maturity date of less than one year. Since the 
loan is not backed by collateral, only highly 
reputable firms can issue commercial paper.
3 A target leverage ratio is not directly observ-
able (since financial firms do not announce it), 
but its value can be inferred from the observed 
behavior of financial firms. See the article by 
Allen Berger, Robert DeYoung, Ozde Oztekin, 
and David Lee for evidence in support of target 
leverage ratios. 
and maturity transformation are not 
problems per se. Perhaps the catalyst 
that turned these well-known forms of 
financial intermediation into a recipe 
for financial ruin was the unwelcome 
concentration of financial risk within a 
handful of very large financial firms. It 
appears that the considerable default 
risk of subprime mortgages was not 
passed on to ultimate investors such 
as households, corporations, pension 
funds, and insurance companies but 
was instead absorbed by a few large 
financial firms. Although the subprime 
segment of the U.S. housing market is 
relatively small, the concentration of 
the default risk of subprime mortgages 
in a few large financial firms ended 
up causing a problem for the entire 
financial system. 
Now let’s turn to a discussion of 
the main channels through which 
a loss in equity in the financial 
sector retards economic activity in 
the nonfinancial sector. The goal is 
to provide some perspective on the 
severity of the downturn that followed 
in the wake of the financial crisis.
DE-LEVERAGING AND THE 
CREDIT CRUNCH
There are several channels 
through which a loss in equity of 
financial firms has adverse effects on 
the nonfinancial sector. Some of these 
channels involve direct effects and 
others, indirect effects. Among the 
direct effects is a pullback in the supply 
of credit that results from de-leveraging 
by financial firms.1
To understand the role of de-
leveraging, we need to understand 
the balance sheet of a financial firm. 
Table 1 gives a simple example of an 
investment bank’s balance sheet. On 
the asset side of the balance sheet 
are loans made by the investment 
bank. Typically, these loans are made 
to the nonfinancial sector, which 
includes businesses, households, and 
the government. In the example, the 
investment bank has bought mortgages 
from households worth $100 and has 
business-sector loans worth $200. On 
the liability side of the balance sheet, 
the investment bank has debt worth 
$250 in the form of commercial paper 
and equity worth $300-$250, or $50.2 
What the balance sheet says is that 
the investment bank has invested $50 
of its own money and $250 worth of 
borrowed money to purchase $300 
worth of assets.
An important aspect of the 
balance sheet is the leverage ratio, 
defined as the ratio of the value of 
assets to equity; in the example, the 
leverage ratio is 6 (300÷50). An 
investment bank likes to maintain a 
target leverage ratio that is low enough 
so as to assure investors who lend it 
money that there is a high probability 
their loans will be repaid. In the 
example, the investment bank can 
sustain losses of up to $50, or one-sixth 
of the value of its assets, and still be 
in a position to pay off its creditors. 
The higher the leverage ratio, the 
less capacity the investment bank 
has to absorb losses without affecting 
its creditors.3 It stands to reason 
that an investment bank’s target 
leverage ratio will ultimately depend 
on investors’ perception of risk in the 
financial system. During periods of 
low perceived risk, the target can be 
expected to rise, and during periods of 
high perceived risk, the target can be 
expected to fall. 
The important point is that an 
adverse shock to the market value 
of assets causes the leverage ratio to 
rise above its target. To understand 
why, suppose the market value of the 
mortgages held by the bank declines 
by 20 percent. In dollar terms, this 
is a loss of $20. Generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP) require 
the investment bank to record the 
value of mortgages on its books at 
current market value. Thus, the bank 
is required to mark down the value 
of mortgages on its books from $100 
to $80. This means that the bank’s 
equity (which is simply the difference between the value of its assets and the 
value of its liabilities) drops from $50 
to $30 ($280-$250) and its leverage 
ratio rises to 8¹/³. If the bank’s target 
leverage ratio was 6 to begin with, 
the loss in the market value of assets 
results in a leverage ratio higher than 
the target.
An increase in the leverage ratio 
above its target value makes investors 
less eager to lend to the investment 
bank. Investors will demand a higher 
interest rate on any new commercial 
paper issued by the investment bank 
(to compensate for the higher risk 
of loss) or stop buying the bank’s 
commercial paper altogether. Thus, 
market forces make it hard for the 
bank to maintain the same level of 
short-maturity debt as before.4 At this 
point, the investment bank must either 
raise more equity or reduce its assets 
(both of which will lower its leverage 
ratio). Raising equity is usually not 
much of an option for banks in the 
midst of a financial crisis, although 
some financial firms did raise equity 
in the early phase of the current crisis 
and have returned to equity markets 
in recent months. Typically, in a crisis, 
the adjustment in the leverage ratio is 
accomplished by reducing assets. For 
instance, in the example above, the 
bank might bring its leverage ratio 
back to 6 by reducing its loans to the 
business sector from $200 to $100, 
with a corresponding $100 reduction 
in commercial paper (from $250 to 
$150). The bank’s balance sheet after 
this adjustment will be as shown in 
Table 2.
The amount by which the 
investment bank must reduce its assets 
is closely related to the leverage ratio 
it would like to maintain, in this case 
6. For every dollar decline in equity, 
the bank must reduce assets by $6. 
Therefore, a $20 decline in equity 
requires the bank to shrink its assets 
by $120. Taking into account the fact 
that the $20 decline in equity was 
triggered by a $20 decline in the value 
of mortgages, the bank must reduce its 
assets by an additional $100 ($120-
$20).
This process of reducing the 
leverage ratio by reducing assets in 
the wake of a loss in equity is called 
de-leveraging. The important point to 
note is that since the leverage ratio 
is a number quite a bit greater than 
one, de-leveraging can convert any 
given decline in equity into a much 
larger decline in investment bank 
assets. Since a bank’s assets are mostly 
loans to the nonfinancial sector, 
de-leveraging results in a constriction 
in the flow of credit to nonfinancial 
firms. A reduction in the supply of 
credit, in turn, raises the firm’s cost 
of credit, thereby reducing firms’ 
demand for investment goods and 
consumer spending by households and, 
ultimately, lowers employment.
Two additional points are worth 
making. First, how much assets have 
to fall because of de-leveraging also 
depends on what happens to the target 
leverage ratio following the initial 
shock to equity. At the start of the 
current crisis, the rise in uncertainty 
caused investors to look for lower 
leverage ratios than was customary 
in the recent past. This, in turn, led 
investment banks to lower their target 
leverage ratio and that became an 
additional factor in the de-leveraging 
engaged in by financial firms. To 
continue with our example, suppose 
that the new target leverage ratio is 
4 instead of 6. Then, starting from 
the position shown in Table 2, the 
new balance-sheet position might 
look like the one in Table 3. To get its 
leverage ratio down to 4, given equity 
of $30, the firm must reduce its asset 
holdings to $120 ($30 times 4). Thus, it 
must reduce its assets by $60 ($180-
$120). In the example in Table 3, the 
reduction is accomplished by reducing 
mortgages and business loans by $30 
each. On the liability side, the bank’s 
commercial paper declines by $60 
(from $150 to $90).
Second, a reduction in investment 
bank debt (in the example, commercial 
paper) goes hand-in-hand with the de-
leveraging. Given this, it is important 
to ask: What happens to the funds 
that investors were formerly lending to 
this bank?  In a crisis, the funds end 
4   Q2  2010 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org
TABLE 2
Assets Liabilities
Mortgages $80 Commercial Paper $150
Business Loans  $100 Equity $30
Total $180 Total $180
4 It is worth pointing out that the leverage ratio 
is closely related to a bank’s capital ratio, a ratio 
that plays an important role in bank regulation. 
The capital ratio is simply the ratio of bank eq-
uity (capital) to a risk-weighted sum of bank as-
sets. As such, it is closely related to the inverse 
of the leverage ratio. A rise in the leverage ratio 
will be accompanied by a decline in the bank’s 
capital ratio. If a bank’s capital ratio falls below 
the level determined by regulation, the bank is 
required by law to take steps to increase its capi-
tal ratio. Thus, an increase in a bank’s leverage 
ratio resulting from a drop in asset values may 
force a bank to take steps to lower its leverage 
ratio for regulatory reasons.     Business Review  Q2  2010   5 www.philadelphiafed.org
TABLE 3
Assets Liabilities
Mortgages $50 Commercial Paper $90
Business Loans  $70 Equity $30
Total $120 Total $120
5  See the article by Evan Gatev and Philip
Strahan and the article by William Lang and 
Leonard Nakamura for evidence on the “flight
to quality” during earlier contractionary episodes.
6 A consequence of de-leveraging is that safe 
borrowers get to borrow at a lower interest rate. 
This could potentially mitigate the contractionary 
effects of de-leveraging except that the primary 
beneficiary of the flight to quality tends to be the 
government, not the private sector.
7 This discussion draws upon the ideas in the 
article by Ben Bernanke and Mark Gertler 
and the article by Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and John 
Moore, especially the latter. 
up in the hands of entities that can 
borrow with very low risk of default. 
Economists refer to this re-allocation 
of funds from risky borrowers to safe 
borrowers as a flight to quality.5 Of 
course, the safe assets are bought from 
existing holders of these assets, who 
are likely to use the proceeds from 
their sale to obtain other safe assets, 
such as deposits at commercial banks. 
So the process of de-leveraging during 
a crisis is likely to increase deposits at 
commercial banks, and if commercial 
banks do not lend out this new inflow 
of funds, it will also increase the 
reserves that the banks hold with the 
Fed. Thus, during a crisis, the process 
of de-leveraging tends to move funds 
out of circulation and into reserves, 
which also puts downward pressure 
on the inflation rate as money in 
circulation tends to fall (or grow more 
slowly).6
 
FALLING PROPERTY VALUES, 
DEBT CAPACITY, AND THE 
FINANCIAL ACCELERATOR
The decline in the flow of credit 
resulting from de-leveraging also has 
adverse consequences for property 
values. The reason is that the value 
of many properties, such as residential 
homes and office buildings, is sensitive 
to the free flow of credit. When credit 
is not easily available, people and 
businesses cannot easily buy houses 
and commercial property. This causes 
a drop-off in the demand for such 
property and results in a fall in their 
market price. For instance, when a 
homeowner who wishes to sell his or 
her house cannot find many buyers 
who can get financing (to buy the 
house), he or she may be tempted to 
drop the asking price. The same is true 
for commercial properties.
A decline in the value of 
residential and commercial properties 
has further consequences for the 
level of aggregate spending. The 
reason is that a decline in property 
values reduces the debt capacity of 
businesses and households — which 
is the maximum amount they are 
permitted to borrow — and thereby 
reduces business investment and 
consumer expenditures (and, 
ultimately, aggregate output).  Thus, 
falling property values lead to a 
decrease in credit offered to the 
nonfinancial sector. This effect is 
what economists call the financial 
accelerator. To understand how the 
financial accelerator works, we need 
to understand why there is a debt 
capacity and why it declines with 
property values.7
Commercial and residential 
properties often serve as collateral in 
business and household borrowing. 
For instance, a business that wishes to 
expand its operations could finance 
the expansion by taking out a loan 
from a bank using its property as 
collateral for the loan. What this 
means is that if the business cannot 
repay the loan, the bank (the lender) 
takes ownership of the property offered 
as collateral against the loan. Banks 
typically only make loans against 
collateral because doing so makes 
the loans less risky and encourages 
borrowers to spend the borrowed funds 
wisely (poor use of the funds results in 
the loss of the collateral). Naturally, 
there is a close connection between 
the value of the collateral and the size 
of the loan offered against it. Banks 
are typically willing to lend up to some 
fraction of the value of the property 
offered as collateral. The maximum 
amount that banks are willing to lend 
against the borrower’s property is the 
borrower’s debt capacity. When there 
is a decline in the value of property 
that can be offered as collateral, there 
is a decline in the debt capacity of the 
nonfinancial sector.
The reduction in debt capacity 
reduces the flow of credit to firms 
with productive uses for funds. Even 
in the midst of a severe downturn, 
there will be businesses that can put 
funds to good use. There will also be 
some financial intermediaries (the 
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that will be eager to lend. But when 
the debt capacity of businesses is 
lowered by a decline in property prices, 
businesses with good uses of funds 
cannot borrow as much as they would 
like. This financial constraint curtails 
business investment and eventually 
leads to an output level that is lower 
than it would be in the absence of a 
decline in debt capacity.
A decline in debt capacity is also 
the reason a decline in home equity 
depresses consumer spending. As 
has been remarked upon many times 
during the current crisis, households 
borrow against their home equity 
to pay for all kinds of consumer 
expenditures. These expenditures 
go well beyond home improvement 
projects (which remain a main 
motivation for home equity loans) and 
encompass expenditures for which it 
would be hard to get a loan directly. 
A decline in residential property 
prices reduces how much households 
can borrow because the property (the 
house in this case) being offered as 
collateral is worth less.8 Once again, 
even in the midst of a crisis, there 
will be households that would like to 
borrow more than their (reduced) debt 
capacity, and these households will 
have to reduce their spending. To the 
extent that the decline in household 
debt capacity constrains business 
investments by small businesses that 
rely on the owners’ assets to get loans, 
the decline will have deleterious effects 
on future output and employment as 
well.
Every decline in property prices 
reduces the debt capacity of the 
nonfinancial sector and thereby adds 
fuel to the financial accelerator. 
The downturn gathers further speed 
and feedback effects kick in: As 
unemployment rises and economic 
activity declines, property prices 
decline even more, which leads to 
further decreases in debt capacity and 
further decreases in expenditures, 
output, and employment.  
Eventually, this downward spiral 
in property prices and economic 
activity comes to a halt, in part 
because the financial accelerator 
begins to lose its potency. Recall 
that the accelerator works through 
a reduction in debt capacity, which 
is the maximum level of debt the 
nonfinancial sector can borrow 
(given existing property prices). But 
when economic activity is quite low, 
debt capacity is not what constrains 
investment on the part of firms 
and households. They reduce their 
investment simply because investment 
is not remunerative when the general 
level of economic activity is low. When 
that stage is reached, a further decline 
in property prices and debt capacity 
does not cause additional reductions in 
expenditure and output because there 
are very few entities (businesses or 
households) that would want to borrow 
more than their debt capacity allows. 
The downward spiral is also arrested 
in part because of policy actions. 
Accommodative monetary and fiscal 
policies shore up expenditures and 
therefore offset, to some extent, the 
decline in expenditures that stems 
from the operation of the financial 
accelerator. 
OTHER FACTORS FEEDING 
THE ACCELERATOR
The previous section began with 
the observation that the credit crunch 
adversely affected property prices 
because property prices are sensitive 
to the free flow of credit. Given the 
magnitude of the financial shock and 
the consequent de-leveraging, the 
credit crunch is probably an important 
factor in the decline in property values. 
However, other factors have played a 
role in the decline in property values 
as well and have therefore fed the 
financial accelerator. We discuss the 
more important channels here.
As already noted, declines in 
residential house prices result in 
declines in home equity and therefore 
a decline in debt capacity. If the 
household already has an existing 
mortgage, the decline in house values 
can lead to home equity becoming 
negative. That is, the value of the 
debt owed becomes larger than 
the value of the property. In this 
situation the homeowner may choose 
to default on his or her mortgage. 
In the run-up to the crisis, many 
families bought homes with very low 
down payments.  Consequently, the 
decline in house prices has resulted in 
many families having negative home 
equity. The result has been a huge 
rise in foreclosures.9 Foreclosures, in 
turn, depress house prices. Foreclosed 
properties are sold at a heavy discount 
because lenders (banks) that end up 
8 If the household has a mortgage against the 
property already, only the value of the house 
in excess of the outstanding mortgage — the 
owner’s home equity — can be offered as col-
lateral against the new loan. A decline in the 
value of residential property reduces home 
equity dollar for dollar.
                                             
                                            
                                              
9 For an excellent discussion of the connection 
between negative home equity and mortgage 
defaults, see the article by Ronel Elul.  Business Review  Q2  2010   7 www.philadelphiafed.org
owning them find it costly to hold 
on to the houses. As the number 
of foreclosures rises, the increased 
presence of sellers willing to sell homes 
at low prices puts downward pressure 
on the price of all properties, including 
those not in foreclosure. 
In addition, foreclosures reduce 
the demand for housing space 
because families who lose homes 
in a foreclosure end up renting less 
space than they owned. They end 
up renting because they cannot get a 
new mortgage after defaulting on the 
previous one, and they rent less space 
than they owned because renting 
does not have the tax advantages that 
homeownership does. Thus, the overall 
demand for housing space declines 
with foreclosures. This puts further 
downward pressure on house prices.10
The decline in house prices also 
reduces the household net worth of 
families who do not go into foreclosure. 
Household net worth is the difference 
in the value of all household assets and 
all household liabilities. It is a measure 
of household wealth. As house prices 
decline, the value of household assets 
declines. But there is no immediate 
change in household liabilities (if the 
household does not choose to default 
on the mortgage), and therefore, there 
is a decline in household wealth. 
Lower wealth translates into lower 
spending because families feel poorer 
and spend less. Economists refer to 
this as the wealth effect. The negative 
wealth effect of a decline in household 
net worth lowers consumer spending, 
which lowers output and employment 
and further depresses property prices.
Increased uncertainty about the 
future also plays a role in reducing 
current output and depressing 
property prices. Greater uncertainty 
(higher probability of both good 
and bad outcomes) makes firms and 
households delay decisions that cannot 
be easily reversed. Most investment 
decisions fall into this category so that 
uncertainty reduces expenditures on 
business fixed investment.11 Greater 
uncertainty (especially uncertainty 
regarding future earnings prospects) 
increases a household’s desire for 
precautionary savings (a rainy-day 
fund), which reduces aggregate 
consumer spending. Overall, 
uncertainty can be a potent force 
for lowering business and household 
investment and is undoubtedly an 
important factor in the current 
downturn.12 It should be noted that the 
increase in the precautionary savings 
on the part of households and firms 
(firms that delay investments park 
their funds in safe financial assets) also 
means that these entities allocate more 
of their funds to safe assets, and this 
is another factor putting downward 
pressure on the yield on safe assets 
and, ultimately, causing funds to 
move out of circulation and into bank 
reserves. 
In sum, there are a host of factors 
working to reduce property prices in 
the wake of the crisis. The severity and 
speed of the current downturn reflects, 
in part, the operation of the financial 
accelerator. The good news is that the 
financial accelerator works both ways. 
As economic activity begins to revive, 
perhaps because of accommodative 
government policy or some good shock, 
desired investment on the part of 
firms begins to rise. At first, firms that 
desire to borrow less than their debt 
capacity (unconstrained firms) are the 
ones that can get funding to undertake 
their investment. But new investment 
(and rising economic activity more 
generally) puts upward pressure on 
property prices. As property prices 
begin to recover, constrained firms 
(firms that would like to borrow more 
than their debt capacity) can borrow 
more as well because the increase 
in property prices increases their 
debt capacity. Of course, additional 
investment increases aggregate output 
in the short run and, eventually, in the 
long run, as well. Thus increases in 
property prices provide extra impetus 
to the rise in economic activity in the 
same way that declines in property 
prices provided extra impetus to the 
decline in economic activity at the 
start of the downturn.
CONCLUSION
In the wake of the financial crisis, 
the U.S. economy has suffered one 
10 The interaction between the foreclosures, the 
tax code, and the demand for housing space 
was investigated in my recent paper with Burcu 
Eyigungor.
                                       
                                             
                                        
                                            
                                          
11  The role of uncertainty in delaying invest-
ment is discussed in the article by Ben Bernanke 
and in the book by Avinash Dixit and Robert 
Pindyck.
12 A discussion of how uncertainty affects 
consumer spending can be found in my recent 
Business Review article. It is worth noting that 
there has been a sharp increase in the personal 
savings rate in the U.S. since the crisis began. 
The savings rate averaged less than 2 percent in 
2007 but rose to around 4.5 percent in 2009 and 
remains elevated.8   Q2  2010 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org
of the worst recessions of the post-
World War II era. There is little doubt 
that this episode will be the focus of 
research and analysis for a long time 
to come and our understanding of the 
origins of the crisis and its aftermath 
will evolve over time.  At this point, 
we can only give provisional answers to 
the question: Why did rising defaults 
in the subprime mortgage market 
cause a financial crisis that led to such 
a severe downturn?
This article suggests that leverage 
and maturity transformation are the 
proximate reasons as to why defaults in 
a relatively small segment of the U.S. 
housing market led to a financial crisis. 
And the severity of the downturn is 
most likely the result of an interaction 
between declining property prices — 
brought on by de-leveraging in the 
financial sector — and the consequent 
decline in the debt capacity of the 
nonfinancial sector. This interaction, 
called the financial accelerator in the 
academic literature, has the potential 
to feed on itself and cause a large 
— and more or less simultaneous 
— decline in property prices and 
economic activity. This diagnosis 
has implications for the future: If the 
financial accelerator played a role in 
making the downturn steep and quick, 
we may expect it to play a role in the 
recovery as well. When the recovery 
takes root, the workings of the 
accelerator will tend to make it sharp 
and rapid. B R
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